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Abstract  
We hypothesize that as the distance of a residential move increases, the cost of collecting 
information on the destination housing market rises, the amount and quality of information 
collected fall, and the chances of making an ill-informed housing purchase decision increases, 
reducing the likelihood of such a purchase. Since owning relative to renting is associated with 
a much larger financial commitment and much higher transaction costs, the propensity to own 
can be expected to decrease with the distance moved. Using data from the Survey of English 
Housing from 1993 to 2008, we document that, consistent with our prior, an increase in the 
distance moved by one standard deviation decreases the probability that a household owns 
the next home by 3.2 percentage points. 
 
 
Keywords: Residential mobility, distance of residential relocation, information cost, 
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1  Introduction 
The decisions ‘whether to own or rent a home’, ‘where to buy’, and ‘what property to buy’ 
are all risky. Ill-informed purchases cannot easily be reversed. This is because, unlike most 
other financial assets, residential properties are quite illiquid and homeownership is, in most 
countries, associated with very high transaction costs
1
.  
Ill-informed purchases also greatly adversely affect a household’s long-term wealth situation. 
This is because households that want to own their home typically have to invest a large share 
of their savings into one single volatile asset; their home. Moreover, most homebuyers 
dramatically leverage this investment by taking on a substantial mortgage. In other words: 
most homebuyers overinvest into residential real estate from a portfolio diversification point 
of view. If the value of the home increases, this has dramatic positive wealth effects. 
Conversely, if the value drops (or has been overestimated in the first place), this often wipes 
out a household’s entire wealth. This is especially true for first-time purchases since in this 
case there is no previous property that could provide a hedge of the form ‘sell low-buy low; 
sell high-buy high’. However, even ‘chain-transactions’ (sell old house and buy new one) are 
associated with significant idiosyncratic risk components that cannot easily be hedged away. 
For example, a house may significantly drop or increase in value because of a new 
development nearby or the turn of a neighborhood to the worse or better. Or a single house 
may unexpectedly develop subsidence issues – a common problem in many English local 
housing markets including the Greater London Area. There is no hedge for these idiosyncratic 
risk components and many of these risks cannot be adequately insured against either. It would 
therefore seem sensible for households, to the extent feasible, to minimize the various risks 
associated with the purchase of a home and, if the risks are judged too high, to put off the 
purchase of a home entirely and rent instead. 
In this paper, we hypothesize that as households move farther away from their original 
residence, search in the destination housing market becomes more difficult and more costly
2
, 
the amount and quality of information collected on the destination housing market and 
individual housing units decrease, and, therefore, purchase decisions become more risky as 
the future sales price becomes more uncertain.  
                                                        
1
 Transaction costs include real estate transfer taxes (in the UK, for example, the Stamp Duty Land Tax ranges 
from 0 to 7% of the house value, depending on the transaction price), estate agent and legal costs (such as deed 
registration fees), search costs (including the costs of conducting a property survey), physical moving costs and 
psychological costs. Transaction costs vary enormously by country. According to the European Mortgage 
Federation (2006) the total transaction costs (more narrowly defined, so e.g. excluding search costs or 
psychological costs and not fully taking account of estate agent fees and some legal costs) range anywhere 
between 2 and 17%, depending on the country considered. In Southern European countries such as Greece, Italy 
and Spain and in Belgium the transaction costs are particularly high, taking all costs into account far exceeding 
10% of the purchase price. Haurin and Gill (2002) estimated the transaction costs of selling a home in the US to 
be in the order of 3% of the house value plus 4% of household earnings. 
2
 The emergence of the Internet may have substantially reduced such costs, but still a site (and neighborhood) 
inspection in person is essential for properties, unlike mass produced goods sold online and hence costs of 
travels for viewing are inevitable. Moreover, reliable information on individual properties, sites and 
neighborhoods and future developments in those neighborhoods typically require more than just a single visit; 
they require in-depth knowledge of the local area and the site that can only be accumulated over time. 
2 
 
The difficulty of search largely arises from the heterogeneity of housing and neighborhood in 
terms of their characteristics and their location. A homebuyer is arguably more likely to make 
an ill-informed investment decision in a remote destination market by either paying too high 
a price (not being fully aware of some problems with the property, the site, the neighborhood, 
or future developments in the area that may adversely affect the value of the property) or 
buying into the ‘wrong’ neighborhood (mismatch). Renters may also misjudge the prevailing 
rent-level or choose the ‘wrong’ neighborhood in remote destination markets, but this has less 
grave consequences as, in contrast to owner-occupiers, renters do not have to bear the capital 
loss associated with the sale of a home plus they face much lower housing transaction costs 
and can therefore move more easily.
3
 Moreover, if say a neighborhood turns bad, this should, 
at least in the longer-run, also be reflected in lower subsequent rents or smaller rent increases, 
compensating the renter for the bad event occurring. 
In an attempt to minimize investment risk, a reasonable strategy for a mover to a remote 
destination market would therefore seem to be to rent a property first and delay a home 
purchase until more (reliable) knowledge can be accumulated about the new neighborhood. 
As a consequence, we would expect that, all else held constant, households that move farther 
away from their original residence are less likely to own their next property than households 
that move nearby. This is the main proposition that we put to the data. 
Our empirical analysis employs data from the Survey of English Housing (SEH). The SEH is 
a rich dataset that provides essential information such as the housing tenure status of 
households (the dependent variable), the distance moved (the key explanatory variable) and 
various demographic and socio-economic characteristics of households and household heads 
(the control variables). Controlling for demographic and socio-economic characteristics of 
mover households helps mitigate concerns of spurious correlation and omitted-variable bias. 
A crucial additional advantage of the SEH is that it provides information on the pre-move 
conditions of households. In particular, the tenure status at the previous accommodation helps 
control for unobservable preferences and the ability to own of households. 
Our empirical analysis reveals three novel insights. Firstly, we provide evidence in favor of 
our proposed mechanism through which moving distance adversely affects the propensity to 
own: We demonstrate that the awareness of neighborhood problems such as crime, vandalism, 
litter and graffiti in the destination housing market decreases with the distance moved. We 
interpret this finding as indicating that movers do have difficulty in collecting information on 
distant housing markets and that they are therefore not fully aware of all the problems present 
in the relevant neighborhoods. Put differently, our implicit assumption is that the awareness 
of neighborhood problems is positively correlated with the amount and quality of information 
mover households have on the new neighborhood prior to the move. 
Secondly, we provide evidence in favor of our main proposition that the propensity to own is 
                                                        
3
 In contrast to the relocation of homeowners, the relocation of renters does not trigger e.g. real estate transfer 
taxes. Moreover, estate agent and legal costs and also the search and physical moving costs are typically much 
lower for rental moves. 
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adversely affected by the moving distance. We demonstrate that our findings are robust to 
controlling not only for demographic and socio-economic characteristics but also for region 
and survey year fixed effects, the previous housing tenure and housing characteristics, and 
dummy variables for the main reason of moving. Our analysis reveals that the negative effect 
is not only highly significant in a statistical sense but also reasonably meaningful in an 
economic sense. Based on our most rigorous specification, an increase in the distance moved 
by one standard deviation, measured at the mean, decreases the probability of owning of a 
representative household by 3.2 percentage points. 
Thirdly, we test the proposition that the adverse effect of the distance moved on the 
propensity to own is of a temporary rather than permanent nature. We find that the length of 
stay at the destination market is adversely affected by the previous moving distance and this 
negative effect is stronger for private renters, consistent with the view that the optimal 
strategy for longer distance movers is to rent first and accumulate information on the 
destination housing market prior to making a momentous investment decision.  
Our paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we discuss the findings of previous related 
studies, clarify the contribution of our paper to the literature and derive empirically testable 
predictions. Section 3 describes the data, outlines our empirical strategy and presents our 
findings. The last section concludes. 
2  Background and testable hypotheses 
2.1  Related research 
Our paper ties into a large literature on the determinants of the housing tenure (own-rent) 
decision. Most of the literature to date has focused on household specific characteristics – in 
our analysis controls – as determinants of the individual tenure choice.4 
The focus of our paper is on the lack of knowledge on a destination housing market, which 
essentially refers to uncertainty about its various aspects. The seminal theoretical paper on the 
role of housing related risks for housing tenure decisions is Henderson and Ioannides (1983). 
Their housing investment-consumption model provides the basis for analyzing housing 
demand and tenure choice. The key element of their model is an investment constraint that 
requires that owner-occupiers must own at least as much housing as they consume, implying 
that typically homeowners have to ‘overinvest’ in housing. Fu (1991) further developed the 
framework and concluded that an increase in the investment risk (variation in house prices) 
should reduce the optimal housing investment. Consequently, an increase in investment risk 
should enlarge the distortion associated with owner-occupied housing. The greater distortion 
then leads to two effects: a reduction in housing consumption conditional on homeownership 
and a reduction in the attractiveness of homeownership relative to renting, implying a 
                                                        
4
 Factors such as basic demographic variables (e.g., Eilbott and Binkowski, 1985; Gyourko and Linneman, 
1996), borrowing constraints (Linneman and Wachter, 1989), race (e.g., Kain and Quigley, 1972; Coulson, 
1999; Gyourko et al., 1999; Painter et al., 2001; Hilber and Liu, 2008; Coulson and Dalton, 2010), expected 
length of stay (e.g., Haurin and Gill, 2002) and taxes (e.g., Rosen, 1979; Hilber and Turner, forthcoming) are 
major determinants of the individual housing tenure choice. 
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reduced probability that households own their home (Hilber, 2005).
5
  
On the empirical side, various studies have investigated the role of uncertainty for own-rent 
decisions. To begin with, Haurin and Gill (1987), Haurin (1991) and Robst et al. (1999) 
demonstrate, using US data, that income uncertainty adversely affects homeownership 
attainment. Diaz-Serrano (2005) reports a similar finding in a European context, where 
institutional settings and property market characteristics are quite different from the US. In a 
related study, Davidoff (2006) shows that individuals whose labor incomes co-vary strongly 
with housing values purchase relative inexpensive homes or rent. 
More closely related to our paper, a number of studies (Rosen et al., 1984; Turner, 2003; 
Turner and Seo, 2007) find that the volatility of house prices adversely affects the propensity 
to own. In a similar vein, and consistent with our findings, Hilber (2005) provides evidence 
that greater neighborhood specific uncertainty significantly reduces the likelihood that 
households own their home and that this effect may be causal. 
A few studies focus on the trade-off between the uncertainty of renting and house price 
uncertainty. Sinai and Souleles (2005) argue that with renting, the long-term cost of obtaining 
housing is unknown. Their empirical findings suggest that the rent hedging benefit associated 
with owner-occupied housing in the US significantly increases the homeownership rate. In a 
follow-up study (Sinai and Souleles, 2013) they point out that existing homeowners may also 
be protected from price fluctuations if they move within the same market or even between 
two markets, to the extent that the covariance in house prices between the two markets is high. 
This hedging argument should apply less though for neighborhood specific uncertainty since 
renters are compensated for shocks to neighborhoods with corresponding adjustments in rents 
(Hilber, 2005) and it should not apply to idiosyncratic risk components that are arguably 
more relevant in our empirical analysis.   
A different strand of the literature focuses on the role of general knowledge on housing 
transactions and how such knowledge affects tenure decisions, e.g. through an inter-
generational transfer of knowledge (Henretta, 1984; Boehm and Schlottman, 1999; Mulder 
and Smits, 1999; Dietz and Haurin, 2003; Haurin and Morrow-Jones 2006). What this 
literature reveals is that information likely plays a role for housing tenure decisions. Yezer 
and Thurston (1976) and DaVanzo (1983) argue that the longer the distance of a move, the 
more costly it is to obtain information on employment opportunities in the new labor market. 
                                                        
5
 While Henderson and Ioannides (1983) and Fu (1991) omit risky assets other than housing, Brueckner (1997) 
provides a formal analysis of the ‘overinvestment’ issue of owner-occupied housing in a framework with several 
risky assets including owner-occupied housing. Using a combination of the housing investment-consumption 
model of Henderson and Ioannides (1983) and the standard mean-variance portfolio framework (Fama and 
Miller, 1980), Brueckner (1997) demonstrates that when the investment constraint induced by owner-occupied 
housing is binding, homeowners cannot adequately diversify their portfolio. Consequently, since the portfolio 
distortion is greater in places with higher housing risk (holding the level of housing consumption constant) and 
since a larger distortion leads to a decrease in the attractiveness of homeownership relative to renting, it follows 
that housing units in risky neighborhoods should be less likely to be owner-occupied (Hilber, 2005). The same 
conclusion can also be derived from a model that analyzes the tenure choice of households in a dynamic 
framework and under uncertainty of income and housing costs (Ortalo-Magné and Rady, 2002). 
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Their findings arguably also apply to the housing market and to the extent this is the case, our 
prediction is that the longer the distance a household moves, the lower is the likelihood of 
homeownership through its negative effect on the amount and quality of the collected 
information on local housing markets. 
To sum up, various types of uncertainty have been shown to lower the likelihood of 
homeownership and hence it can be inferred that lack of information or knowledge on local 
housing markets, which increases the uncertainty about housing investments in those markets, 
is also likely to discourage homeownership. Since house prices are strongly affected by 
location specific characteristics, knowledge on local housing markets may thereby have a 
greater impact on the homeownership decision than general knowledge of the process of 
buying a home. To our knowledge, the effect of the former type of knowledge has not been 
explored rigorously so far. The most closely related study to ours is Clark and Huang (2004) 
who look at the relationship between the distance moved and the homeownership status using 
the British Household Panel Survey. They suggest that homeowners do not show a 
particularly strong tendency to return to renting even after they make long-distance moves 
but their conclusion is based solely on descriptive statistics. This paper is the first study to 
test our main hypothesis formally in a rigorous way through an econometric approach. 
2.2  Testable predictions 
The amount of information obtained on new housing and neighborhoods is likely to decrease 
with the distance moved as previously argued by e.g. Yezer and Thurston (1976) or DaVanzo 
(1983). In terms of empirical prediction we would expect that the awareness of neighborhood 
problems in the destination housing market decreases with the distance moved, since movers 
have difficulty collecting reliable information on the problems – especially less apparent ones 
such as property crime or occasional vandalism – in more distant housing markets. We can 
formulate our first testable prediction as: 
Prediction 1: The awareness of neighborhood specific problems decreases as the 
distance moved increases. 
In the new housing markets, the movers face uncertainty about the quality of the 
neighborhood and the appropriate price level for housing of a given quality. This uncertainty 
is expected to encourage movers to opt to rent since renting implies no house price risk 
(which can be substantial for poorly informed buyers) and lower subsequent moving costs. 
Yet, the degree of uncertainty is expected to increase with the distance moved as the 
collection of information on the new housing market becomes increasingly difficult. Hence, 
our main prediction can be formulated as: 
Prediction 2: The longer the distance moved the more likely households are to choose 
private renting over owner-occupation. 
After settling down in the new accommodation, the level of the mover’s knowledge of the 
local area is expected to gradually increase over time. We would therefore expect a corrective 
or adjustment move to more permanent owner-occupied accommodation nearby, as soon as 
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the mover household has been able to accumulate sufficient information and thus reduce the 
investment risk in the local market. The tendency to adjust housing quality and micro-
location within the same housing market sooner rather than later should be stronger for 
longer-distance movers as they are less likely to be satisfied with their first accommodation in 
the new market due to the informational shortage. We can formulate our third prediction as: 
Prediction 3: The longer the distance moved the more likely households are to move 
again shortly after the initial move.  
Through testing Predictions 1 to 3, we aim to demonstrate that facing uncertainty regarding 
the quality and conditions of new housing and neighborhoods, a long-distance mover’s 
rational behavior may be to first move into temporary private rental accommodation and then 
later settle into a more permanent owner-occupied place. 
3  Empirical analysis 
3.1  Data 
The data for our empirical analysis comes from the Survey of English Housing (SEH) 
provided by the UK Office of National Statistics. The SEH ran for fifteen years from 1993/94 
until 2007/08 and covered close to 30,000 English households annually.
6
 The SEH provides 
the essential information for our analysis, including the household’s housing tenure status 
(owner-occupier, private renter or public renter), the distance moved, scores of self-assessed 
problems in the household’s neighborhood, housing-related characteristics, and demographic 
and socio-economic characteristics of households and their heads. An important feature of the 
survey is that, although it is cross-sectional in nature, it provides inter-temporal information 
on the households, allowing us to track the circumstances of a household over two time 
periods including, how the distance between the past and contemporaneous residential 
location affects the contemporaneous housing tenure choice. Of the inter-temporal 
information, the previous tenure status is particularly helpful in that it allows us to control for 
household preferences and a household’s ability to own – both are not usually observed 
directly in survey data. Our regression sample consists of data from all 15 survey years. The 
resulting large sample size allows us to carry out additional tests for various sub-samples. The 
unit of observation is the household but the survey also provides personal information on the 
household heads.
7
 
The SEH provides detailed information on a household’s housing tenure status. Three main 
groups can be distinguished: homeowners, private renters, and public renters.
8
 The focus of 
                                                        
6
 The SEH ended in 2007/8 and was merged with the English House Condition Survey to form a single housing 
survey for the UK called the English Housing Survey. To ensure the continuity and consistency of the variables, 
we only use the SEH for our analysis. 
7
 The SEH defines a ‘household head’ or ‘household reference person’ as a person in whose name the 
accommodation of the household is owned or rented. 
8 The group of ‘homeowners’ includes households that ‘own outright’, ‘own with a mortgage’, and ‘partly 
own/partly rent’. The group of ‘public renters’ includes households that ‘rent from local council or housing 
association’. The group of private renters includes households that ‘rent from private landlords, property 
companies, employers, organizations or relatives and friends’.  
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our empirical analysis is on the choice between owner-occupation and private renting. The 
inclusion of public renting in our analysis, as a tenure choice, would be problematic because 
in England public rental accommodation is allocated in a complex administrative process, 
based on formal criteria (income level and number of children). Unlike the own vs. private 
rent decision, it is not the outcome of households’ cost-benefit considerations under 
uncertainty.
9
 We therefore exclude public renters from our analysis. 
The main explanatory variable in our various estimating equations is the distance between the 
previous (original) and the current (destination) accommodation, as self-assessed by the 
moving households. The variable is reported in the SEH as a categorical variable with 8 
groupings, ranging from ‘under 1 mile’ to ’50 miles or more’. We exclude households that 
migrated from Northern Ireland or abroad
10
 and converted the original variable to a 
continuous variable by taking the mid-value of each range
11
. The conversion facilitates the 
interpretation of our empirical results and allows us to estimate specifications with interaction 
terms between distance moved and other characteristics of households.  
The control variables can be grouped into demographic and individual-specific characteristics 
of household heads, household characteristics, housing characteristics, and survey year and 
region dummies. We exclude two groups of household heads from our analysis. Firstly, we 
drop the 601 students in the sample. Students usually leave their family for college or 
university, so for a relatively short period of time, they live independently from their parents, 
and they become heads of their own households. Students in the UK typically move long 
distance rather than locally and they almost always rent their accommodation. Their housing 
tenure is determined mainly by the short expected length of stay. We also exclude 1,337 
households that report that the main reason for moving is their intention to become 
homeowners out of concern of reversed-causation.
12
 
The total number of households available for the entire duration of the survey is 429,878. Our 
sample size is significantly smaller since the information on the distance moved is only 
available for those households that moved within 3 years of the time of the survey being 
                                                        
9
 Of the many characteristics of private renting, our analysis focuses on its ability to offer easy and quick access 
to and exit from accommodation without much financial commitment/investment risk. Whereas private renters 
in England typically have short expected durations in their accommodations and little financial commitment, 
public renters normally have very long expected stays and potentially a lot to lose from exiting. This is because 
public rental housing in England is strongly subsidized, characterized by ‘undersupply’ and, hence, long waiting 
lists. Unlike the own-rent decision of higher income households, which is arguably driven by cost-benefit 
considerations under uncertainty, low income households with many children will almost certainly opt for 
subsidized public rental housing if given the option (often after many years waiting in a queue). 
10
 Households that moved from Northern Ireland or abroad are excluded from the regression sample as they are 
likely to choose private renting mainly because they are unfamiliar with the institutional settings of the English 
property and mortgage markets, rather than because they do not have knowledge of the local areas where they 
have settled down (the theoretical mechanism we explore in our analysis). 
11
 For example, 0.5 miles for the category of ‘under 1 mile’, 1.5 miles for ‘1 mile but not 2 miles’, 3.5 miles for 
‘2 miles but not 5 miles’, etc. For the category of ‘over 50 miles’, we assigned ‘75 miles’ arbitrarily. However, 
choosing other arbitrary values such as 50 or 100 miles leaves our results virtually unchanged.  
12
 The inclusion or exclusion of either of the two groups or both groups does not alter our findings. The 
estimated adverse impact and significance levels of the distance moved on the propensity to own – our main 
finding – are virtually unaffected. 
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conducted, meaning they were relatively recent movers. This reduces the sample size to 
67,648. We further drop public renters, foreign migrants, students and those households that 
moved ‘for homeownership’, reducing our sample to 44,489 households. Finally, households 
are dropped if they have missing values in any of the variables, leaving us with a sample size 
of 37,755 observations. The summary statistics for this sample are reported in Table 1. 
Starting from this number of observations, the exact sample size used to test Predictions 1 to 
3 varies somewhat due to the exclusion of some observations, depending on the specification 
estimated, as discussed below. 
3.2 Empirical strategy  
Prediction 1 is concerned about the relationship between the distance moved and the level of 
information that the movers hold on the new neighborhood. The SEH provides information 
on how household heads think about the severity of local problems such as crime. Our 
expectation is that households who move a longer distance and therefore have less 
information on the destination neighborhood will be unaware of many micro-location specific 
problems and will therefore underestimate these problems. The mover’s assessment of the 
local problems is of course not only affected by the distance moved, but also by the easily 
observable severity of the problems/quality of the neighborhood. If easily observable 
neighborhood quality were correlated with the distance moved but omitted from the 
regression, then the estimated coefficient on the distance moved variable would be biased. 
This could be, for example, because households may want to move away from local problems 
through long distance moves.  
As the SEH does not provide any direct information on neighborhood quality, our strategy is 
to indirectly control for neighborhood quality – to the extent feasible – by including variables 
in our empirical specification that are likely to be strongly related to neighborhood quality 
such as real household income and house value council tax bands. Real household income is 
well-known to be strongly positively associated with neighborhood quality due to the fact 
that the higher the income, the more likely the household is to live in a good neighborhood. 
Local house values also have a close relationship with neighborhood quality through the 
process of house price capitalization (see Hilber, 2012, for a synthesis of the recent literature). 
In our empirical specifications we use the local house value council tax band as a proxy for 
local house values. Council tax bands do not precisely measure the capitalized value of the 
current neighborhood quality; rather they represent the ‘sustained’ neighborhood quality as 
assessed by local Council officials.
13
 House value council tax bands can be considered to be 
a noisy but exogenous assessment of the neighborhood quality. Importantly, they do not 
represent a subjective assessment by the survey respondent. Finally, the physical size of 
housing units – as measured e.g. by the number of bedrooms – is likely related to the quality 
                                                        
13
 House value council tax bands are determined by the local Council – the local jurisdictions in England – 
based on the characteristics of the property, the site, and the location. Survey respondents have no influence over 
the house value council tax band. The tax bands do not represent current house values but historic values that 
broadly reflect the capitalized value of the quality of the neighborhood (at least within a city). Council tax bands 
change rarely and survey year fixed effects should capture any year specific (space-invariant) unobserved effects. 
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of the neighborhood. Large (and expensive) houses are found more often in high-quality 
neighborhoods.  
Our expectation is that, holding household characteristics and the neighborhood quality 
constant and controlling for the survey year, longer distance movers will self-report lower 
severities of neighborhood problems in the destination housing market. Specifically, we can 
test Prediction 1 by estimating the following equation:  
𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑠𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑜𝑓 𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑗𝑡= 𝛼0+𝛼1𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑚𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑑𝑖 
+𝛼2𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖 + 𝛼3𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑗 + 𝛼4𝐷𝑡+𝜀 (1) 
whereas i, j, and t denote the household/head, location/property
14
, and survey year 
respectively. 
The dependent variable takes one of the following three values: a specific local problem, for 
example, crime is ‘serious’ (value = 1), ‘problematic but not serious’ (value = 2), or ‘not a 
problem at all’ (value = 3). Since a lower value of the dependent variable indicates greater 
severity, holding all else constant, Prediction 1 implies that 𝛼1 should be positive. 
Estimating an ordered logit model is appropriate here, as only an order among the options of 
the dependent variables is known. To check whether Prediction 1 finds support in the data for 
different types of local problems, we investigate the cases of crime, vandalism, litter and 
graffiti. 
Prediction 1 suggests that, holding the neighborhood quality constant, the extent to which a 
mover household is aware of neighborhood problems in the destination market at the time of 
the tenure decision should decrease with the distance moved. Hence, in order to accurately 
test Prediction 1, ideally, we would use the self-assessment of neighborhood problems at the 
point in time of the housing tenure decision. However, this information is not available in the 
SEH. As a second best alternative, we limit our regression sample only to mover households 
that, at the time of the survey interview, had lived in their current accommodation for a short 
period of time. We therefore drop all households from the regression sample that have lived 
in their current home for one year or more and only keep the most recent movers (henceforth, 
‘recent movers’). Our rationale for choosing a one year window is that while households start 
accumulating information on the destination neighborhood as soon as they move in, it would 
seem reasonable to assume that it takes some time – a year or more rather than just weeks or 
a few months – to fully comprehend the nature and complexity of the neighborhood, likely 
development plans, and accumulated social capital etc. To the extent that households 
accumulate all relevant information nearly instantaneously (within weeks or months) we 
would expect not to find a significant positive coefficient 𝛼1. Out of the sample of 37,755 
observations – reported in Table 1 – 15,202 had lived in their locations for less than one year. 
                                                        
14
 Location refers to the site, neighborhood, and region. Location-specific variables include: the house value 
council tax band and the region fixed effects. Property-specific variables include the number of bedrooms and 
the accommodation type.  
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In addition, the regression sample size varies depending on the type of neighborhood problem 
considered. For example, for crime the sample size is 10,543 households. Table 1 provides 
more detail. 
Our main research objective is to test whether, holding other things constant, the distance 
moved affects the mover’s decision whether to own or rent privately. We specify the 
regression model such that the probability of homeownership is expressed as a function of the 
distance moved along with other controls. Our main estimating equation can be expressed as: 
𝑃𝑟(𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑖𝑗𝑡) =𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑚𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑑𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖 + 𝛽3𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑗 + 𝛽4𝐷𝑡+𝜗  (2) 
whereas i, j, and t again denote the household/head, location/property, and survey year 
respectively. 
The dependent variable is a dummy that takes the value of 1 if a household is an owner-
occupier or 0 if it rents from a private landlord. The model is estimated by maximum 
likelihood logit. Our main Prediction 2 implies that the estimated coefficient of the distance 
moved (𝛽1) should take a negative sign.  
One set of household-specific control variables appears uniquely in estimating equation (2): 
dummy variables for the tenure status of household i in the previous accommodation. 
Specifically, we include two dummy variables, one for public renters and one for private 
renters (owner-occupiers are the omitted category). The past tenure status is likely correlated 
with both the current tenure status and the distance moved. Previous homeowners tend to 
become homeowners again and are arguably more reluctant to move short distances as 
substantial moving costs cannot be justified for short-distance moves.  
In order to test Prediction 2, we again confine the regression sample to ‘recent movers’. We 
are interested in the relationship between the distance moved and the housing tenure status at 
the time of the move. We expect that the negative link between distance moved and 
homeownership will be diluted over time, as long-distance movers, who are more likely to be 
renters, are expected to move again at a faster rate than short-distance movers. The sample of 
‘recent movers’ again includes 15,202 households. When the cases with missing values 
relating to the previous tenure variable are dropped, the final sample size for the regressions 
is 13,185.  
Prediction 3 states that the longer the distance moved, the more likely movers are to make an 
adjustment move shortly after the initial move. If this is true, the proportion of residents with 
lengthier stays should be lower among the longer-distance movers than among the shorter-
distance ones. We can test this prediction by estimating the following estimating equation: 
𝐿𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑡ℎ 𝑜𝑓 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑡=𝛾0 + 𝛾1𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑚𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑑𝑖 + 𝛾2𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖 + 𝛾3𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑗  
+𝛾4𝐷𝑡+𝜇    (3) 
whereas i, j, and t again denote the household/head, location, and survey year respectively. 
The dependent variable is the length of stay in the current accommodation. It is given as a 
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categorical variable taking one of the following three values: ‘less than 1 year’, ‘1 year but 
not 2 years’ and ‘2 years but not 3 years’. The reason for why the length of stay (the 
dependent variable) does not go beyond 3 years is because the information on the distance 
moved (the key explanatory variable) is only available for those who have lived in the current 
accommodation for less than 3 years. The categorical dependent variable is converted into a 
continuous variable by taking the mid-value of the range (e.g. half a year for ‘less than 1 
year’). Since the transformed variable is continuous, we use OLS to estimate equation (3). 
Prediction 3 suggests that the estimated coefficient 𝛾1 on the distance moved variable should 
have a negative sign. 
The set of other control variables is similar to those used in equations (1) and (2). The 
dummy variables capturing the housing tenure status are particularly important, as private 
renters are more likely to move again soon and also to have moved longer distances than 
homeowners. Unlike in the previous specifications, testing Prediction 3 does not require the 
regression sample to be limited to recent movers, as the length of stay is the main explanatory 
variable. All 37,755 observations are used. Table 1 reports the summary statistics. 
3.3  Empirical results 
Table 2 reports the ordered logit regression results for Prediction 1 that the awareness of 
neighborhood specific problems decreases as the distance moved increases (i.e., the proposed 
mechanism that we argue is driving long-distance movers to rent rather than own). (Table 2 
only reports the coefficients of the key variable ‘distance moved’. We report the full set of 
results with all controls in Table A1 in an unpublished Web-Appendix.) The dependent 
variable in columns (1) to (4) is a measure that captures how serious household heads think 
crime is in their local areas. Since a smaller value of the measure indicates a more serious 
problem, we would expect that the coefficient on the distance variable is positive.   
Column (1) reports findings for a specification that only includes the distance moved plus 
regional and time dummies. The estimated coefficient (0.0053) turns out to be positive and 
significant at the 1% level, consistent with Prediction 1. However, the coefficient could be 
biased due to omitted variables. When household heads’ personal and household 
characteristics are additionally controlled for in column (2), the estimate for the distance 
moved remains statistically significant at the 1% level but goes down somewhat (0.0045) and 
arguably becomes less. This is not surprising since various demographic and socio-economic 
characteristics are correlated with the distance moved. Though not explicitly shown, the 
addition of real household income contributes most strongly to the decline of the estimated 
coefficient on ‘distance moved’, consistent with our reasoning above. In column (3) we 
additionally control for housing characteristics. Adding the various housing controls reduces 
the coefficient on ‘distance moved’ further to 0.0041. Though again not shown explicitly, the 
housing value control derived from council tax bands, contributes most strongly to the drop 
in the coefficient on ‘distance moved’. Lastly, as shown in column (4), when the main reason 
for moving is also controlled for, the estimate of interest decreases further to 0.0034. 
However, even after carefully controlling for a large set of covariates in column (4), the 
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estimated coefficient of the distance moved still remains positive and remains highly 
statistically significant at the 1% level. In columns (5) to (7), we report the same regression 
result as that reported in column (4), but with alternative dependent variables: seriousness of 
vandalism, graffiti and litter. Again, smaller values of the measures indicate more serious 
problems, so we would again expect that the coefficient on the distance variable is positive in 
all cases. Though the results vary somewhat depending on the outcome measure, the 
estimates of the distance moved variable are positive and statistically significant, at least at 
the 10% level, throughout. All the results are consistent with the hypothesis that the distance 
moved does have a negative effect on the level of information that movers hold on 
destination housing markets. 
Table 3 documents the results of logit estimates for Prediction 2 (the main proposition), 
which states that the longer the distance moved, the lower is the probability that a household 
becomes an owner-occupier. Again, Table 3 only reports the key findings; the full set of 
results is reported in the unpublished Web-Appendix Table A2. The explanatory variables that 
are thought to be correlated with both the distance moved and the probability of 
homeownership are grouped into three categories and controlled for gradually, from left to 
right. In all columns, the distance moved has a negative relationship with the probability of 
homeownership, consistent with Prediction 2, and in all specifications the estimated effect is 
statistically significant at the 1% level. The estimates for the distance moved vary 
substantially depending on the types of control variables included in the empirical model. 
When personal, household and housing characteristics are controlled for in columns (2) and 
(3), the negative relationship between distance moved and the probability of homeownership 
becomes substantially stronger (0.011 and 0.014 compared to 0.0053 in column 1).  
However, when we add controls for ‘the main reasons for moving’, the coefficient drops 
again to 0.0054. The explanation for this drop is the fact that the reasons for moving are 
correlated with the distance moved. Those who want to move for job-related reasons (often 
for better job opportunities in large labor markets such as London) need to move long 
distances whilst those moving for housing- or neighborhood-related reasons move short 
distances.
15
 The average distance moved for housing-related movers in the regression sample 
used in Table 3 is 5 to 6 miles, for neighborhood-related movers it is 13 to 17 miles and for 
job-related movers it is about 50 miles. At the same time, the reasons for moving are also 
correlated with the homeownership status. Housing- and neighborhood-related movers tend 
to owner-occupy their new homes, whereas the job-related movers tend to rent, regardless of 
the distance moved. One explanation for this is that, in contrast to housing- and 
neighborhood-related movers, the prime focus of job-related movers is on their new jobs 
rather than on finding a permanent place to live in. In fact, this is another piece of evidence 
that the information available on the local housing market has an influence on movers’ 
housing tenure decisions. Overall, the reasons for moving are correlated with both, the 
distance moved and the tenure decision, and controlling for the reasons substantially reduces 
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 See also Hilber and Lyytikäinen (2013) for more evidence on this in the context of the existence of the UK 
Stamp Duty Land Tax and for further implications. 
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the strength of the negative correlation between them. However, the correlation is still 
negative and significant at the 1% level, consistent with Prediction 2. 
Another, potentially important, factor determining the housing tenure status is the degree to 
which a household is financially constrained (e.g., Linneman and Wachter, 1989). In a 
hypothetical setting where all households are severely financially constrained, nobody would 
own and the distance moved would be unrelated to homeownership. Therefore, the more 
financially constrained households are, the more biased towards zero the relationship between 
the distance moved and homeownership can be expected to be.  
The SEH, like most other household datasets, does not include household wealth, a measure 
for how down-payment constrained households are. However, the dataset does include 
information on the previous housing tenure status; and therefore, by implication, on whether 
households have collateral (i.e., a home), the proceeds (capital gains) of which they can use 
to purchase a home in a subsequent move. Moreover, previous homeowners are also better 
placed to obtain a new mortgage. Therefore, previous homeowners’ contemporaneous tenure 
decisions can be expected to be less likely affected by financial constraints than those by 
previous renters and, hence, the effect of the distance moved on the contemporaneous 
propensity to own can be expected to be less biased towards zero. Indeed, the interaction 
effects between different types of previous housing tenure (homeowner, private renter and 
public renter), reported in column (1) of Table 4, reveal that the distance moved only affects 
the contemporaneous tenure choice at the destination location of previous homeowners but 
not of previous private renters or social renters.
16
 Another implication from this finding is 
that informational constraints also matter for those who are wealthy enough to afford 
homeownership (possibly even outright). Even if households want to and are able to own, 
uncertainty about the value of a potential investment induced by lack of reliable information 
likely discourages homeownership. Overall, these results provide further indication that lack 
of housing and neighborhood information are very important for housing tenure decisions. 
Similar to the previous tenure status, household income also likely captures the ability of 
households to afford homeownership, as it reflects the degree to which households are 
liquidity constrained. Hence, in a similar vein, in column (2) of Table 4 we examine whether 
the relationship of interest varies among different income groups. Our prediction is that the 
higher the household income, the less likely households are financially constrained and, 
therefore, the more negative should be the estimated effect of the distance moved on the 
propensity to own. There are four levels of household income in our data: ‘£0 to £9,999’; 
‘£10,000 to £19,999’; ‘£20,000 to £49,999’, and; ‘£50,000 and over’. Using the interaction 
terms between the different income groups on the one hand and the distance moved on the 
other hand, we thus estimate for each income group separately the effect of the distance 
moved on the propensity to own. The empirical results are again consistent with our 
prediction; the lowest income group indeed has the smallest estimate (with a positive sign) 
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 Table 4 reports only the coefficients and standard errors for the key interaction effects. For the full set of 
results we refer the interested reader to the unpublished Web-Appendix Table A3.  
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and it is not statistically different from zero, while the top income group has the largest and 
the most statistically significant negative estimate. The result provides further indication that 
households can express their preference over residential tenure types according to the 
distance moved only when they are not severely financially constrained. 
As discussed above, the main reasons for moving are correlated with the intensity of the 
search in the destination housing markets. Those households that want to move for housing 
and neighborhood related reasons can be expected to search more intensely than those that 
move for job-related reasons, regardless of the distances they plan to move. Therefore, the 
relationship between the propensity to own and the distance moved is expected to be weaker 
and less significant for housing- and neighborhood-related movers. We test and confirm this 
hypothesis using the interaction terms between the distance moved and the reasons for 
moving and report results in column (3) of Table 4. The estimates for ‘distance × 
neighborhood’ and ‘distance × housing’ are positive but not statistically different from zero, 
while the coefficients on the remaining interaction effects/reasons (‘distance × had to move’; 
‘distance × personal/family reasons’; ‘distance × job-related reasons’) are all negative and 
significant. Of these, the estimate for the job-related movers is the most negative, implying 
that the job-related movers’ propensity to own is more strongly adversely affected by the 
distance moved than that of any other group of movers. 
Table 5 reports quantitative effects of the relationships of interest based on the various 
regression results reported in Tables 3 and 4. The first row reveals that, according to the core 
specification in Table 3, column (4), a one standard deviation increase in the distance moved 
from its mean, reduces the probability of being a homeowner by 3.2% points. This suggests 
that the impact of the distance moved on homeownership is quantitatively reasonably 
meaningful.  
The remaining rows in Table 5 report quantitative interpretations of the various estimated 
interaction effects. Panel A reveals that a one standard deviation increase in the distance 
moved reduces the propensity of a previous homeowner to own again by 6.1% points, a 
quantitatively quite meaningful effect. Similarly, as Panel B documents, a one standard 
deviation increase in the distance moved reduces the propensity to own of a household with 
earnings of ‘£50,000 or more’ by 8.6% points. Finally, Panel C suggests that a one standard 
deviation increase in the distance moved reduces the propensity to own of a job related mover 
by 8.4% points. 
Table 6 finally reports OLS regression results of the test of Prediction 3, which states that the 
longer the distance a household has moved, the more likely it is to move again soon to find 
more permanent accommodation within the same housing market. As discussed in Section 3.2, 
our empirical strategy is to run OLS regressions with the dependent variable being the length 
of stay in the current location and the main explanatory variable being the distance moved. 
The coefficient on the distance moved variable is expected to be negative. Column (1) in 
Table 6 reports results for a specification that only includes the distance moved plus time and 
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region dummies.
17
 The estimate of the distance moved on the length of stay is indeed 
negative and statistically different from zero with 99% confidence, implying that longer-
distance movers move again at a faster rate than their shorter-distance counterparts. This 
result is persistent and the coefficient on the distance moved variable becomes slightly larger 
when additional controls are added. Columns (2) and (3) of Table 6 provide details. Lastly, 
we would expect that the effect of interest is stronger among private renters. This is because 
those who do not yet live in permanent accommodation but plan to move to more permanent 
accommodation will likely be private renters in the first place. Therefore, the estimated effect 
of the distance moved on the length of stay should be more negative for private renters. 
Column (4) of Table 6 provides evidence consistent with this prediction. Though the effect is 
smaller for homeowners, it is worth noting that even homeowners tend to stay for a shorter 
period, the longer the distance they had moved previously. This latter finding is consistent 
with two different interpretations: (1) long distance movers may generally be more mobile 
and (2) long distance movers are more likely to make ill-informed housing decisions that 
result in mismatch and, as a consequence, homeowners may be more likely to re-adjust their 
housing choice despite the fact that this triggers a capital loss, stamp duty payments, and 
other transaction costs. Having said all this, the fact that the distance moved effect is about 
twice as strong for private renters, provides support for our main proposition that long 
distance moves, as a consequence of information decay, discourage households to own.  
4  Conclusion 
Previous research found that housing investment risk has a significant adverse impact on the 
decision of households to own. In this paper we explore the link between the distance moved, 
the corresponding information decay and increased investment risk, and the subsequent 
propensity of households to buy rather than rent their home. Our key findings can be 
summarized as follows: An increase in the distance moved reduces the amount and/or quality 
of information households have on the destination housing market. This in turn increases the 
housing investment risk in the destination market (although we cannot explicitly show this 
link in our empirical analysis) and thereby reduces the propensity to own – our main 
empirical finding. This adverse effect on homeownership is not permanent however. 
Households that moved a longer distance, especially private renters, are more likely to have a 
shorter stay in their home compared to households that moved a shorter distance. This 
implies that those long-distance movers who were discouraged to buy in the destination 
market, as a consequence of the distance induced investment risk, start accumulating 
information on the local property market and specific sites as soon as they move to the new 
area. This in turn lowers their investment risk over time and encourages them to consider 
making a more permanent ‘corrective’ move locally with the intent to buy a home. 
Overall, our empirical findings suggest that information gathered on local housing markets 
has an important adverse effect on the propensity of a household to own: The difficulty of 
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 Table 6 only reports the key results. However, the full set of results including coefficients and standard errors 
for the control variables is documented in the unpublished Web-Appendix Table A4. 
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collecting information on the destination housing market discourages homeownership. More 
generally, this finding may at least partially explain why immigrants (who move very long 
distances and have least information on the destination housing market) tend to have lower 
homeownership propensities, even when controlling for numerous other factors that drive 
housing tenure decisions. Conversely, it can be argued that a well-functioning private rental 
housing market for temporary accommodation serves (at least) two important purposes: it 
prevents ill-informed housing purchases that can only be reversed with a significant financial 
loss and, since long-distance movers typically move for job-related reasons, it facilitates 
matching in the labor market. 
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TABLES 
 
Table 1 
Summary statistics 
 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Homeowner 37755 0.715 0.451 0 1 
Distance moved 37755 16.0 24.9 0.5 75 
Length of stay (categories) 37755 1.878 0.818 1 3 
Age of HH head 37755 38.8 13.2 16 95 
Age squared of HH head 37755 1682.1 1241.0 256 9025 
Sex of HH head 37755 1.259 0.438 1 2 
Economic status of HH head  
 (Full-time employed excl.)      
 Part-time employed 37755 0.062 0.242 0 1 
 Unemployed 37755 0.029 0.168 0 1 
 Retired 37755 0.075 0.263 0 1 
 Inactive 37755 0.060 0.237 0 1 
Household composition 
     
 (Single excl.)      
 Couple 37755 0.653 0.476 0 1 
 Lone parent 37755 0.081 0.273 0 1 
 Multi-family HH 37755 0.040 0.195 0 1 
 No. of children 37755 0.647 0.972 0 7 
 No. of adults 37755 1.842 0.685 1 9 
Real HH income 
     
(£0-£9,999 excl.)      
£10,000-£19,999 37755 0.289 0.453 0 1 
£20,000-£49,000 37755 0.422 0.494 0 1 
£50,000 or more 37755 0.081 0.273 0 1 
No. of bedrooms 37755 2.702 0.989 1 10 
Accommodation type 
     
(Detached/Bungalow excl.)      
Semi-detached 37755 0.284 0.451 0 1 
Terraced 37755 0.291 0.454 0 1 
Purpose-built flat 37755 0.104 0.305 0 1 
Converted flat 37755 0.086 0.281 0 1 
House value - council tax band 
     
 (Up to 40k excl.)      
Up to £52k 37755 0.196 0.397 0 1 
Up to £68k 37755 0.219 0.414 0 1 
Up to £88k 37755 0.195 0.396 0 1 
Up to £120k 37755 0.107 0.309 0 1 
Up to £160k 37755 0.054 0.226 0 1 
Up to £320k 37755 0.040 0.195 0 1 
Over £320k  37755 0.008 0.090 0 1 
Main reasons for moving 
  (Neighborhood-related excl.)      
 Housing-related 37755 0.295 0.456 0 1 
 Had to move 37755 0.125 0.331 0 1 
 Personal/family-related 37755 0.328 0.469 0 1 
 Job-related 37755 0.120 0.325 0 1 
Region           
(North East excl.)      
North West 37755 0.123 0.328 0 1 
Yorkshire & the Humber 37755 0.095 0.294 0 1 
East Midlands 37755 0.084 0.277 0 1 
West Midlands 37755 0.088 0.283 0 1 
Eastern 37755 0.120 0.325 0 1 
London 37755 0.129 0.335 0 1 
South East 37755 0.193 0.395 0 1 
South West 37755 0.120 0.324 0 1 
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Table 1—Continued 
 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Year of survey 
     
(1993 excl.)      
1994 37755 0.050 0.218 0 1 
1995 37755 0.059 0.235 0 1 
1996 37755 0.060 0.238 0 1 
1997 37755 0.072 0.259 0 1 
1998 37755 0.084 0.278 0 1 
1999 37755 0.078 0.268 0 1 
2000 37755 0.080 0.271 0 1 
2001 37755 0.078 0.268 0 1 
2002 37755 0.075 0.263 0 1 
2003 37755 0.073 0.261 0 1 
2004 37755 0.069 0.253 0 1 
2005 37755 0.066 0.248 0 1 
2006 37755 0.061 0.240 0 1 
2007 37755 0.057 0.232 0 1 
Assessment of neighborhood problems      
 Crime 10543 2.495 0.657 1 3 
 Vandalism 11594 2.634 0.593 1 3 
 Graffiti 10360 2.779 0.483 1 3 
 Litter 11689 2.586 0.640 1 3 
Previous tenure  
 (Homeowner excluded)      
 Public renter 13185 0.065 0.246 0 1 
 Private renter 13185 0.406 0.491 0 1 
Note: The size of the regression samples varies depending on the predictions tested. See Section 3.2 for a detailed discussion.  
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Table 2 
Ordered logit regression on neighborhood problem awareness 
(Dependent variable: Seriousness of crime, vandalism, graffiti, and litter in the area) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 Crime Crime Crime Crime Vandalism Graffiti Litter 
        
Distance moved 0.00530*** 0.00449*** 0.00406*** 0.00343*** 0.00382*** 0.00251* 0.00203** 
 (0.00083) (0.00084) (0.00085) (0.00102) (0.00106) (0.00135) (0.00100) 
Personal/household characteristics  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
        
Tenure, housing characteristics   Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
        
Main reasons for moving    Yes Yes Yes Yes 
        
Government office regions Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
        
Survey year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
        
Pseudo R-squared 0.0217 0.0302 0.0375 0.0392 0.0332 0.0440 0.0482 
No. of obs. 10543 10543 10543 10543 11594 10360 11689 
Notes: ***, **,* significance level at 1, 5, and 10% respectively. Age, sex and economic status are of household heads. The full regression results are reported in the 
unpublished Web-Appendix Table A1. 
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Table 3 
Logit regressions for homeownership decision 
(Dependent variable: Homeownership status) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Distance moved 
only 
Personal/HH 
char. 
Housing 
char. 
Main reasons 
for moving 
     
Distance moved -0.00527*** -0.0108*** -0.0140*** -0.00538*** 
 (0.00069) (0.00084) (0.00095) (0.00118) 
     
Personal/household 
characteristics 
 Yes Yes Yes 
     
Tenure, housing characteristics   Yes Yes 
     
Main reasons for moving    Yes 
     
Government office regions Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Survey year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Pseudo R-squared 0.0134 0.2131 0.3581 0.3771 
No. of obs. 13185 13185 13185 13185 
Notes: ***, **,* significance level at 1, 5, and 10% respectively. Age, sex and economic status are of household 
heads. The full regression results are reported in the unpublished Web-Appendix Table A2. 
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Table 4 
Logit regressions for tenure decision with interaction terms 
(Dependent variable: Homeownership status) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
  
Distance ×  
Previous tenure 
Distance ×
HH income 
Distance × 
Reasons for  
moving 
    
Interaction term: 
Distance moved × Previous tenure 
   
    
Distance × prev. HO -0.00957***   
 (0.00141)   
Distance × prev. public renter -0.00377   
 (0.00341)   
Distance × prev. private renter 0.00014   
 (0.00164)   
Interaction term: 
Distance moved × HH income 
   
    
Distance × £0-9,999  0.00045  
  (0.00201)  
Distance × £10,000-19,999  -0.00289  
  (0.00191)  
Distance × £20,000-49,999  -0.00996***  
  (0.00168)  
Distance × £50,000 or more  -0.0129***  
  (0.00328)  
Interaction term: 
Distance moved × Reasons for moving 
   
    
Distance × neighborhood   0.00123 
   (0.00306) 
Distance × housing   0.00192 
   (0.00371) 
Distance × had to move   -0.01080*** 
   (0.00386) 
Distance × personal/family reasons   -0.00368** 
   (0.00187) 
Distance × job-related reasons   -0.01147*** 
   (0.00223) 
    
Personal/household characteristics Yes Yes Yes 
    
Tenure, housing characteristics Yes Yes Yes 
    
Main reasons for moving Yes Yes Yes 
    
Government office regions Yes Yes Yes 
    
Survey year dummies Yes Yes Yes 
    
Pseudo R-squared 0.3785 0.3785 0.3782 
No. of obs. 13185 13185 13185 
Notes: ***, **,* significance level at 1, 5, and 10% respectively. Age, sex and economic status are of household 
heads. The full regression results are reported in the unpublished Web-Appendix Table A3. 
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Table 5 
Predicted probability of homeownership by distance moved (%) 
 
 
Specification Marginal effect Change in % points ¹
)
  
Total sample Table 3 (4) -0.00538*** -3.23%*** 
Panel A: By previous tenure  
 
 
Previous homeowner Table 4 (1) -0.00957*** -6.07%*** 
Previous public renter Table 4 (1) -0.00377 -2.10% 
Previous private renter Table 4 (1) 0.00014 +0.08% 
Panel B: By household income  
 
 
£0-£9,999 Table 4 (2) 0.00045 +0.25% 
£10,000-£19,999 Table 4 (2) -0.00289 -1.71% 
£20,000-£49,999 Table 4 (2) -0.00996*** -6.10%*** 
£50,000 or more Table 4 (2) -0.0129*** -8.58%*** 
Panel C: By reason for moving  
 
 
Neighborhood-related Table 4 (3) 0.00123 +0.65% 
Housing-related Table 4 (3) 0.00192 +0.54% 
Had to leave Table 4 (3) -0.01080*** -3.79%*** 
Personal/family-related Table 4 (3) -0.00368** -2.18%** 
Job-related Table 4 (3) -0.01147*** -8.43%*** 
Note: 
1) 
Change in the probability of homeownership for an increase in the distance moved by 1 standard 
deviation, measured at the means of the independent variables.  
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Table 6 
OLS regressions for length of stay 
(Dependent variable: Length of stay) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Distance 
moved and  
FEs only 
Add 
personal/HH 
characteristics 
Add housing 
characteristics 
Distance ×
 Tenure 
     
Distance moved -0.00093*** -0.00129*** -0.00114***  
 (0.00017) (0.00017) (0.00020)  
Interaction terms:     
Distance × Homeowner    -0.00086*** 
    (0.00024) 
Distance × Private renter    -0.00172*** 
    (0.00029) 
Personal/household characteristics  Yes Yes Yes 
     
Tenure, housing characteristics   Yes Yes 
     
Main reasons for moving   Yes Yes 
     
Government office regions Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Survey year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Adj. R-squared 0.0041 0.0383 0.0675 0.0677 
No. of obs. 37755 37755 37755 37755 
Notes: ***, **,* significance level at 1, 5, and 10% respectively. Age, sex and economic status are of household 
heads. The full regression results are reported in the unpublished Web-Appendix Table A4.  
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UNPUBLISHED WEB-APPENDIX 
 
Table A1 
Ordered logit regression on neighborhood problem awareness 
(Dependent variable: Seriousness of crime, vandalism, graffiti, litter in the area) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 Crime Crime Crime Crime Vandalism Graffiti Litter 
Distance moved 0.00530*** 0.00449*** 0.00406*** 0.00343*** 0.00382*** 0.00251* 0.00203** 
 (0.00083) (0.00084) (0.00085) (0.00102) (0.00106) (0.00135) (0.00100) 
Age  0.003 -0.007 -0.011 0.003 -0.007 -0.025** 
  (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.014) (0.011) 
Age squared  0.000127 0.000199 0.000241* -0.000053 0.000186 0.000318** 
  (0.000133) (0.000135) (0.000136) (0.000133) (0.000167) (0.000128) 
Sex (Female excl.)  0.054 0.052 0.051 0.054 0.077 -0.054 
  (0.053) (0.054) (0.054) (0.054) (0.066) (0.052) 
Economic status of HH        
(Full-time employed excl.)        
Part-time employed  -0.116 -0.137 -0.138 -0.172** -0.174 -0.246*** 
  (0.088) (0.089) (0.090) (0.087) (0.107) (0.087) 
Unemployed  -0.319** -0.288** -0.285** -0.041 -0.148 -0.169 
  (0.127) (0.127) (0.127) (0.122) (0.149) (0.122) 
Retired  0.070 -0.002 -0.012 0.268* -0.084 -0.316** 
  (0.156) (0.157) (0.158) (0.160) (0.218) (0.155) 
Inactive  -0.315*** -0.288*** -0.291*** -0.239** -0.059 -0.258*** 
  (0.099) (0.099) (0.100) (0.097) (0.123) (0.099) 
Household composition        
(Single excl.)        
Couple  0.285*** 0.210*** 0.190** -0.005 0.031 0.005 
  (0.076) (0.078) (0.078) (0.080) (0.099) (0.078) 
Lone parent  0.107 0.023 0.032 0.088 0.134 0.015 
  (0.095) (0.096) (0.097) (0.097) (0.123) (0.097) 
Multi-family HH  0.348*** 0.271** 0.242* -0.060 0.034 -0.130 
  (0.125) (0.126) (0.126) (0.127) (0.155) (0.125) 
Number of children  -0.028 -0.051* -0.057** -0.064** -0.048 -0.025 
  (0.025) (0.027) (0.027) (0.028) (0.034) (0.027) 
Number of adults  -0.173*** -0.188*** -0.189*** -0.070 -0.012 -0.073 
  (0.045) (0.047) (0.047) (0.048) (0.060) (0.047) 
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Table A1—Continued 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 Crime Crime Crime Crime Vandalism Graffiti Litter 
Household real income 
 (£0-£9,999 excl.) 
       
£10,000-£19,999  0.078 0.013 0.017 0.053 0.189** -0.062 
  (0.068) (0.069) (0.069) (0.068) (0.085) (0.067) 
£20,000-£49,999  0.230*** 0.092 0.094 0.192** 0.185** -0.026 
  (0.073) (0.076) (0.076) (0.076) (0.094) (0.075) 
£50,000 or more  0.149 0.005 0.011 0.293** 0.070 0.038 
  (0.098) (0.108) (0.108) (0.116) (0.135) (0.114) 
Homeowner (Private renter excl.)   -0.110** -0.109** -0.039 -0.190*** -0.057 
   (0.050) (0.051) (0.051) (0.065) (0.050) 
Number of bedrooms   -0.052* -0.052* -0.039 -0.124*** -0.114*** 
   (0.031) (0.031) (0.032) (0.041) (0.032) 
Accommodation type        
(Detached/bungalow excl.)        
Semi-detached   -0.066 -0.069 -0.171** -0.088 -0.111 
   (0.067) (0.067) (0.074) (0.098) (0.075) 
Terraced   -0.313*** -0.297*** -0.458*** -0.404*** -0.650*** 
   (0.072) (0.072) (0.077) (0.101) (0.077) 
Purpose-built flat   -0.281*** -0.260*** -0.418*** -0.398*** -0.433*** 
   (0.096) (0.096) (0.102) (0.130) (0.101) 
Converted flat   -0.650*** -0.639*** -0.671*** -0.630*** -0.846*** 
   (0.102) (0.103) (0.107) (0.133) (0.105) 
House values – council tax band        
(Up to £40k excl.)        
Up to £52k   0.295*** 0.295*** 0.326*** 0.335*** 0.401*** 
   (0.066) (0.066) (0.065) (0.080) (0.063) 
Up to £68k   0.392*** 0.387*** 0.523*** 0.503*** 0.610*** 
   (0.069) (0.069) (0.071) (0.088) (0.070) 
Up to £88k   0.392*** 0.393*** 0.496*** 0.524*** 0.679*** 
   (0.081) (0.081) (0.082) (0.104) (0.081) 
Up to £120k   0.352*** 0.346*** 0.630*** 0.691*** 0.791*** 
   (0.095) (0.096) (0.101) (0.128) (0.102) 
Up to £160k   0.419*** 0.409*** 0.597*** 0.731*** 1.099*** 
   (0.121) (0.122) (0.129) (0.164) (0.136) 
Up to £320k   0.450*** 0.437*** 0.741*** 0.966*** 1.310*** 
   (0.138) (0.138) (0.152) (0.187) (0.159) 
Over £320k   -0.059 -0.061 0.912*** 1.668*** 0.855*** 
   (0.225) (0.225) (0.295) (0.426) (0.286) 
29 
 
 
Table A1—Continued 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 Crime Crime Crime Crime Vandalism Graffiti Litter 
Main reasons for moving        
(Neighborhood-related excl.)        
Housing-related    -0.325*** -0.267*** -0.338*** -0.357*** 
    (0.071) (0.077) (0.099) (0.076) 
Had to leave    -0.357*** -0.309*** -0.341*** -0.398*** 
    (0.081) (0.086) (0.110) (0.084) 
Personal/family-related    -0.382*** -0.330*** -0.355*** -0.358*** 
    (0.070) (0.076) (0.097) (0.074) 
Job-related    -0.244*** -0.326*** -0.298** -0.350*** 
    (0.092) (0.098) (0.125) (0.095) 
Constant 0.714*** 0.966*** 0.315 -0.084 -0.935*** -1.712*** -1.955*** 
 (0.129) (0.258) (0.282) (0.292) (0.290) (0.360) (0.283) 
Government office regions Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Survey year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pseudo R-squared 0.0217 0.0302 0.0375 0.0392 0.0332 0.0440 0.0482 
No. of obs. 10543 10543 10543 10543 11594 10360 11689 
Notes: ***, **,* significance level at 1, 5, and 10% respectively. Age, sex and economic status are of household heads.  
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Table A2 
Logit regressions for homeownership decision 
(Dependent variable: Homeownership status) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Distance moved 
only 
Personal/HH 
char. 
Housing 
char. 
Main reasons 
for moving 
     
Distance moved -0.00527*** -0.0108*** -0.0140*** -0.00538*** 
 (0.00069) (0.00084) (0.00095) (0.00118) 
Age  0.124*** 0.013 0.010 
  (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) 
Age squared  -0.000827*** 0.000060 0.000077 
  (0.000141) (0.000151) (0.000154) 
Sex (Female excl.)  0.365*** 0.331*** 0.300*** 
  (0.060) (0.069) (0.069) 
Economic status of HH     
(Full-time employed excl.)     
Part-time employed  -0.274*** -0.388*** -0.448*** 
  (0.091) (0.101) (0.102) 
Unemployed  -1.116*** -0.851*** -1.033*** 
  (0.129) (0.134) (0.138) 
Retired  0.940*** 0.709*** 0.518*** 
  (0.177) (0.179) (0.184) 
Inactive  -1.195*** -1.046*** -1.135*** 
  (0.100) (0.105) (0.107) 
Household composition     
(Single excl.)     
Couple  0.832*** 0.728*** 0.687*** 
  (0.084) (0.095) (0.097) 
Lone parent  0.002 -0.392*** -0.369*** 
  (0.097) (0.106) (0.107) 
Multi-family HH  -0.536*** -0.685*** -0.712*** 
  (0.139) (0.160) (0.162) 
Number of children  0.156*** -0.148*** -0.147*** 
  (0.026) (0.030) (0.030) 
Number of adults  -0.139*** -0.355*** -0.365*** 
  (0.049) (0.053) (0.054) 
Household real income     
(£0-£9,999 excl.)     
£10,000-£19,999  0.861*** 0.669*** 0.703*** 
  (0.071) (0.079) (0.080) 
£20,000-£49,999  1.468*** 0.937*** 0.987*** 
  (0.076) (0.088) (0.090) 
£50,000 or more  1.748*** 0.832*** 0.832*** 
  (0.109) (0.136) (0.137) 
Previous tenure status     
(Previous HO excl.)     
Previous public renter   -1.184*** -1.285*** 
   (0.092) (0.093) 
Previous private renter   -1.815*** -2.019*** 
   (0.054) (0.061) 
Number of bedrooms   0.374*** 0.370*** 
   (0.039) (0.039) 
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Table A2—Continued 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Distance moved 
only 
Personal/HH 
char. 
Housing 
char. 
Main reasons 
for moving 
Accommodation type     
(Detached/bungalow excl.)     
Semi-detached   0.010 -0.002 
   (0.082) (0.084) 
Terraced   -0.190** -0.210** 
   (0.087) (0.090) 
Purpose-built flat   -0.940*** -0.912*** 
   (0.113) (0.115) 
Converted flat   -1.418*** -1.410*** 
   (0.120) (0.123) 
House value - council tax band     
 (Up to £40k excl.)     
Up to £52k   0.266*** 0.254*** 
   (0.078) (0.078) 
Up to £68k   0.467*** 0.456*** 
   (0.083) (0.084) 
Up to £88k   0.572*** 0.561*** 
   (0.095) (0.097) 
Up to £120k   0.359*** 0.422*** 
   (0.115) (0.117) 
Up to £160k   0.603*** 0.617*** 
   (0.149) (0.152) 
Up to £320k   0.329* 0.382** 
   (0.178) (0.184) 
Over 320k   0.171 0.302 
   (0.356) (0.357) 
Main reasons for moving     
(Neighborhood-related excl.)     
Housing-related    -0.094 
    (0.077) 
Had to leave    0.632*** 
    (0.095) 
Personal/family-related    -0.300*** 
    (0.081) 
Job-related    -1.130*** 
    (0.105) 
Constant 0.881*** -3.646*** -0.040 0.330 
 (0.127) (0.294) (0.356) (0.368) 
Government office regions Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Survey year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pseudo R-squared 0.0134 0.2131 0.3581 0.3771 
No. of obs. 13185 13185 13185 13185 
Notes: ***, **,* significance level at 1, 5, and 10% respectively. Age, sex and economic status are of household heads.   
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Table A3 
Logit regressions for tenure decision with interaction terms 
(Dependent variable: Homeownership status) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
  Distance × Previous  
tenure 
Distance × HH 
income 
Distance × Reasons  
for moving 
Interaction term: 
Distance moved × Previous tenure 
   
Distance × prev. HO -0.00957***   
 (0.00141)   
Distance × prev. public renter -0.00377   
 (0.00341)   
Distance × prev. private renter 0.00014   
 (0.00164)   
Interaction term: 
Distance moved × HH income 
   
Distance × £0-9,999  0.00045  
  (0.00201)  
Distance × £10,000-19,999  -0.00289  
  (0.00191)  
Distance × £20,000-49,999  -0.00996***  
  (0.00168)  
Distance × £50,000 or more  -0.0129***  
  (0.00328)  
Interaction term: 
Distance moved × Reasons for moving 
   
Distance × neighborhood   0.00123 
   (0.00306) 
Distance × housing   0.00192 
   (0.00371) 
Distance × had to move   -0.01080*** 
   (0.00386) 
Distance × personal/family reasons   -0.00368** 
   (0.00187) 
Distance × job-related reasons   -0.01147*** 
   (0.00223) 
Age 0.009 0.010 0.008 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
Age squared 0.000089 0.000074 0.000094 
 (0.000153) (0.000154) (0.000155) 
Sex (Female excl.) 0.295*** 0.297*** 0.295*** 
 (0.069) (0.069) (0.069) 
Economic status of HH    
(Full-time employed excl.)    
Part-time employed -0.440*** -0.440*** -0.455*** 
 (0.103) (0.103) (0.102) 
Unemployed -1.018*** -1.044*** -1.052*** 
 (0.139) (0.139) (0.138) 
Retired 0.544*** 0.489*** 0.477** 
 (0.184) (0.183) (0.185) 
Inactive -1.117*** -1.144*** -1.145*** 
 (0.107) (0.107) (0.107) 
Household composition (Single excl.)    
Couple 0.697*** 0.676*** 0.671*** 
 (0.097) (0.097) (0.097) 
Lone parent -0.378*** -0.348*** -0.370*** 
 (0.108) (0.107) (0.107) 
Multi-family HH -0.683*** -0.717*** -0.736*** 
 (0.162) (0.162) (0.162) 
Number of children -0.148*** -0.145*** -0.143*** 
 (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) 
Number of adults -0.369*** -0.359*** -0.360*** 
 (0.054) (0.054) (0.054) 
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Table A3—Continued 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
  Distance × Previous  
tenure 
Distance × HH 
income 
Distance × Reasons  
for moving 
Household real income    
(£0-£9,999 excl.)    
£10,000-£19,999 0.700*** 0.741*** 0.708*** 
 (0.080) (0.089) (0.080) 
£20,000-£49,999 0.994*** 1.154*** 1.000*** 
 (0.090) (0.098) (0.090) 
£50,000 or more 0.844*** 1.101*** 0.851*** 
 (0.136) (0.165) (0.137) 
Previous tenure status (Previous HO excl.)   
Previous public renter -1.411*** -1.294*** -1.283*** 
 (0.109) (0.093) (0.093) 
Previous private renter -2.216*** -2.032*** -2.031*** 
 (0.073) (0.061) (0.061) 
Number of bedrooms 0.371*** 0.368*** 0.371*** 
 (0.039) (0.039) (0.040) 
Accommodation type    
(Detached/bungalow excl.)    
Semi-detached -0.007 -0.005 0.010 
 (0.084) (0.085) (0.085) 
Terraced -0.206** -0.211** -0.202** 
 (0.089) (0.090) (0.090) 
Purpose-built flat -0.903*** -0.905*** -0.902*** 
 (0.115) (0.115) (0.115) 
Converted flat -1.398*** -1.409*** -1.406*** 
 (0.124) (0.124) (0.124) 
House value - council tax band    
(Up to £40k excl.)    
Up to £52k 0.250*** 0.248*** 0.257*** 
 (0.079) (0.078) (0.079) 
Up to £68k 0.451*** 0.441*** 0.454*** 
 (0.084) (0.084) (0.084) 
Up to £88k 0.554*** 0.554*** 0.557*** 
 (0.097) (0.097) (0.098) 
Up to £120k 0.414*** 0.415*** 0.423*** 
 (0.117) (0.117) (0.117) 
Up to £160k 0.622*** 0.610*** 0.612*** 
 (0.151) (0.152) (0.152) 
Up to £320k 0.383** 0.373** 0.380** 
 (0.182) (0.184) (0.184) 
Over 320k 0.322 0.265 0.271 
 (0.359) (0.355) (0.353) 
Main reasons for moving    
(Neighborhood-related excl.)    
Housing-related -0.105 -0.092 -0.036 
 (0.078) (0.078) (0.087) 
Had to leave 0.677*** 0.640*** 0.786*** 
 (0.096) (0.096) (0.107) 
Personal/family-related -0.306*** -0.306*** -0.223** 
 (0.081) (0.081) (0.095) 
Job-related -1.141*** -1.030*** -0.718*** 
 (0.103) (0.106) (0.150) 
Constant 0.447 0.278 0.284 
 (0.368) (0.369) (0.370) 
Government office regions Yes Yes Yes 
Survey year dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Pseudo R-squared 0.3785 0.3785 0.3782 
No. of obs. 13185 13185 13185 
Notes: ***, **,* significance level at 1, 5, and 10% respectively. Age, sex and economic status are of household heads.  
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Table A4 
OLS regressions for Length of stay 
(Dependent variable: Length of stay) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Distance moved 
only 
Personal/HH 
characteristics 
Housing 
characteristics 
Distance ×  
Tenure 
Distance moved -0.00093*** -0.00129*** -0.00114***  
 (0.00017) (0.00017) (0.00020)  
Interaction terms: 
Distance moved × Tenure type 
    
Distance × Homeowner    -0.00086*** 
    (0.00024) 
Distance × Private renter    -0.00172*** 
    (0.00029) 
Age  0.030*** 0.023*** 0.023*** 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Age squared  -0.000239*** -0.000184*** -0.000183*** 
  (0.000025) (0.000025) (0.000025) 
Sex (Female excl.)  0.014 -0.003 -0.003 
  (0.012) (0.011) (0.011) 
Economic status of HH 
(Full-time employed excl.) 
 
    
Part-time employed  -0.030 -0.008 -0.009 
  (0.019) (0.018) (0.018) 
Unemployed  -0.067** 0.018 0.015 
  (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) 
Retired  0.030 -0.006 -0.008 
  (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) 
Inactive  -0.078*** 0.009 0.007 
  (0.021) (0.020) (0.020) 
Household composition 
(Single excl.) 
 
    
Couple  0.059*** 0.019 0.018 
  (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
Lone parent  0.002 0.013 0.012 
  (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) 
Multi-family HH  -0.069*** -0.018 -0.020 
  (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) 
Number of children  0.048*** 0.043*** 0.043*** 
  (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Number of adults  -0.015* -0.006 -0.005 
  (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
Household real income 
(£0-£9,999 excl.) 
    
£10,000-£19,999  0.059*** -0.003 -0.002 
  (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
£20,000-£49,999  0.113*** 0.017 0.019 
  (0.015) (0.016) (0.016) 
£50,000 or more  0.126*** 0.043* 0.044* 
  (0.021) (0.022) (0.022) 
Homeowner (Private renter excl.)   0.343*** 0.328*** 
   (0.011) (0.012) 
Number of bedrooms   -0.001 -0.001 
   (0.006) (0.006) 
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Table A4—Continued 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Distance moved 
only 
Personal/HH 
characteristics 
Housing 
characteristics 
Distance ×  
Tenure 
Accommodation type     
(Detached/bungalow excl.)     
Semi-detached   -0.015 -0.014 
   (0.013) (0.013) 
Terraced   -0.023 -0.022 
   (0.015) (0.015) 
Purpose-built flat   -0.041** -0.040** 
   (0.020) (0.020) 
Converted flat   -0.056*** -0.056*** 
   (0.021) (0.021) 
House value - council tax band     
(Up to £40k excl.)     
Up to £52k   0.016 0.017 
   (0.014) (0.014) 
Up to £68k   0.000264 0.001 
   (0.015) (0.015) 
Up to £88k   0.016 0.016 
   (0.017) (0.017) 
Up to £120k   -0.016 -0.015 
   (0.020) (0.020) 
Up to £160k   -0.057** -0.057** 
   (0.025) (0.025) 
Up to £320k   -0.085*** -0.085*** 
   (0.029) (0.029) 
Over 320k   -0.089* -0.088* 
   (0.051) (0.051) 
Main reasons for moving     
(Neighborhood-related excl.)     
Housing-related   -0.015 -0.014 
   (0.014) (0.014) 
Had to leave   0.006 0.006 
   (0.017) (0.017) 
Personal/family-related   0.012 0.012 
   (0.014) (0.014) 
Job-related   0.054*** 0.057*** 
   (0.018) (0.018) 
Government office regions Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Survey year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 1.991*** 1.093*** 1.090*** 1.100*** 
 (0.029) (0.054) (0.060) (0.060) 
Adj. R-squared 0.0041 0.0383 0.0675 0.0677 
No. of obs. 37755 37755 37755 37755 
Notes: ***, **,* significance level at 1, 5, and 10% respectively. Age, sex and economic status are of household heads.  
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